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Abstract 
Improvements in economic efficiency and productivity are the most important sources for 
economic growth, however, have yet to occur in Russia. The Soviet Union left an institutional 
vacuum and large economic distortions behind, which set the stage for an established elite to 
systematically exploit factors of production for their personal benefit lacking the incentives to 
restructure. This paper generates some empirical highlights of the outcomes of industrial 
transformation from 1987 to 1997. The following results are worth mentioning: (1) Early steps 
of liberalization, the attempts to macro-stabilization and the launch of the privatization 
package did not bring about improved economic efficiency in industrial production; (2) Less 
concentrated and highly localized industries performed better, which can mainly be explained 
by the performance of the resource extracting industries; (3) Price liberalization revealed 
increasing returns in industrial production and the contribution of capital to output declined 
rapidly, while the contribution of labor increased. 
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1. Introduction 
In western economies productivity gains are the most important source for economic growth 
and for improvement in the standard of living. Using the resources at hand more effectively 
has historically been far more important  quantitatively  than capital formation. Likewise 
in transition economies, efficiency gains and productivity improvements in industrial 
production are among the most important factors for economic success. However, the 
institutional set-up guiding economic activities must be designed so that economic agents do 
not gain from exploiting arbitrage opportunities and ‘precious mentirosos’ but rather from real 
productivity and efficiency improvements and creation of new markets through innovation. 
In this paper the effects of price liberalization and stabilization packages on industrial 
performance, measured by efficiency estimates, are assessed. It is argued that the attempts 
of early shock therapy largely failed and did not contribute to efficiency gains in the Russian 
economy. Aslund (1999) describes the period between 1991 and 1993 as one where the 
attempt at radical economic reform was tried, but actual reforms were slow and partial, 
leading to extraordinary rent seeking through subsidized credits and arbitrage in foreign 
trade. Price and foreign trade liberalization, macro-economic stabilization and early 
privatization were the main items on the transition agenda during the period analyzed. 
Although the macro-economic factors changed the economics of firms and industries 
drastically, successful restructuring and/or relocation in Russian industries did not take place. 
Instead, elaborate schemes were designed to guarantee the persistence of survival 
networks, which maximize current rents. 
However, restructuring will, at least in the long run, constitute the most important determinant 
for economic growth in Russia. What we have witnessed so far, has been a pattern of 
seemingly disorganized decline across all of the industrial sectors. Despite the fact that price 
liberalization and stabilization packages did not bring about the desired effects of efficiency 
improvement and expected industrial expansion, the privatization program was readily 
implemented. Although, Russia currently appears to have formally privatized most of the 
industrial sector, the measures of restructuring are still largely inadequate to ensure 
sustainable economic growth and stabilization. On the industry level the gap to the rest of 
the world is widening. This leaves Russian industry largely non-competitive on the badly 
performing national market and even less competitive on international markets. There are, of 
course, some noteworthy exceptions, mainly in the natural resource extracting branches of 
the economy. In addition, industrial enterprises still employ far more workers than supported 
by their levels of output and potential productivity. Physical capital is largely obsolete as 
illustrated by the fact that in 1980 the average age of physical capital was 9.5 years, 
whereas in 1995 it increased to 14.1 years (see Interfax Statistical Report No. 4, 1998) and 
further increased thereafter. Compared to OECD levels the average age of Russia’s 
industrial plants is three times higher. This is due to the fact that investment activities have 
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virtually ceased in many industrial branches. Depleting national savings, capital flight, a lack 
in attracting (foreign) investors and a banking sector lacking the knowledge and incentives to 
invest in the manufacturing sector, left industry largely without financial resources for 
technological upgrading. The downward spiral does not seem to have stopped as investment 
in fixed capital was 7% lower in 1998 than in 1997, and a further 5–6% drop is on the horizon 
for 1999.  
In short, Russia’s industrial sector shows every sign of regression from the target of quick 
and thorough restructuring. Gaddy and Ickes (1999) argue that the Russian economy is 
bifurcating as some enterprises restructure reducing the distance to the market, while other 
enterprises exploit relationship capital to survive without restructuring. The latter involves 
barter, tax offsets, and survival with enterprise directors showing paternalistic behavior with 
labor hoarding as the main enterprise goal. At the same time, Russian enterprises fail to pay 
wages. Aslund (1999) argues that radical economic reform largely failed because of 
extraordinary rent-seeking by old enterprise managers through expert rents, subsidized 
credits, import subsidies, and direct government subsidies, while gaining little from 
privatization. The existence of powerful and highly organized business networks, combined 
with an increasing power vacuum of the state, led to enormous rent seeking. In many cases, 
government regulations even supported the powerful elite to increase and monopolize rents. 
The resulting structures from colluding interests of Kremlin technocrats and the business 
elite was later called the negotiated economy (‘Ekonomika torga’) (Aven, 1999). Many argue 
that Russia’s post communist period has been characterized by the struggle of the newly-
rich to preserve their economic power by preventing liberal reform, which would jeopardize 
extraordinary export rents, subsidized credits, import privileges and direct government 
subsidies in various forms. Hellman (1998) summarized this consequence of partial reform 
as “Winners Take All”. Schleifer and Vishny (1998) call these government pathologies “The 
Grabbing Hand”.1 
However, since Russia’s last financial debacle in August 1998, the opportunities of quick 
money with large margins in trade, GKOs and other fields (‘ne-traditionalnije pribeli’) have 
dried up. The devaluation of the Ruble has increased the competitiveness of Russian goods 
on the internal market (imports decreased by about 50%). The devaluation combined with 
factors such as increased oil prices, little inflow of foreign financial capital, decreasing share 
of barter due to increased liquidity, a restructured banking system, etc., render the model of 
the ‘virtual economy’ concept obsolete. Contrarily, this gives justification to the virtual 
economy concept, where survival networks were created to retain market share which, 
taking inter-temporal optimization into account, would be more costly to regain in the future. 
Thus, the artificial support of supply chains, whatever form it took on, makes perfect 
economic sense if we look at it from a more dynamic perspective. Liquidity, under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 However, their own names appeared in a number of irregularities (see, e.g., Wedel, 1998 or Filipov and Marcus, 
1997). 
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environment of heavy competition from imported goods, was mainly generated through 
revenues from the oil and gas industry.2 
Finally, it would appear that restructuring might now become the main economic (policy) 
agenda in the upcoming years since the domestic market becomes increasingly important for 
Russian manufacturers. Only a technological and managerial upgrading, through a 
fundamental restructuring of Russia’s industrial sector, will generate the necessary 
momentum to put an end to Russia’s economic and social debacle and preserve Russia’s 
territorial unity. 
2. Historical Review 
2.1 1987 to 1991: Progressing Sclerosis due to Power Struggles on 
Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions 
Until 1989, reforms took place at the periphery of the Soviet economic system. In the official 
debates, they were seen as no more than useful subsidiary changes that would provide 
support for the main task of reforming the publicly owned and state managed economy. 
During the 80s, the Soviet system was governed by a thin elite layer who controlled all 
effective decision-making and resources. Senior bureaucrats and managers were no longer 
afraid of the supreme leaders. It was argued that even before Gorbachev came into power, 
mechanisms for controlling bureaucrats and vital information flows in key Soviet 
organizations were weak, thereby allowing these individuals great latitude in their actions, 
which were mainly guided by personal benefit and preferences. Aslund (1999) argues that 
through the Law on Cooperatives, management theft was effectively legalized.3 The 
mechanisms and the institutional design of this scheme, which made former top communists 
the wealthiest capitalists in the world, are described in greater detail in Kotz and Weir (1997). 
The basic structures we try to understand today have their roots in this period. The basic 
logic of business structures has not changed much in the meantime and the last series of 
political leaders indicate a reversal to perestroika politics. 
The main aim of perestroika in the economy was to introduce elements of market regulation 
within the main public sector of the economy while, at the same time, maintaining the 
general framework of state ownership and centralized economic management. However, in 
1989, only a few years after the implementation of the Law on Cooperatives, a radical shift in 
the policy agenda occurred. The next set of reforms sought not only to decrease the role of 
the state in economic management, but also to introduce new forms of property relations in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 If we apply a similar logic of the virtual economy to western economies we would very quickly discover that most of 
our economies are virtual. 
3 This allowed managers of state enterprises to establish private enterprises, which undertook arbitrage with the 
state enterprise they were managing, transferring the profit of state enterprises to management-owned private 
enterprises. Commercial banks became the most prominent new free-wheeling cooperatives.  
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the state sector taking a more gradual approach by using the European social-democratic 
system as a model. As far as reforms affecting the peripheral economy were concerned, the 
Gorbachev leadership hoped that the reforms introduced would create healthy competition 
from the cooperatives to stimulate state managers into improving their own performance and 
behavior according to market criteria. For example, the Abalkin reform envisaged that by 
1995 some 80–90% of the output would be determined by the market, and some 35% of 
property would be outside direct state ownership (Ekonimicheskaya Gazeta No. 44, 1989). 
However, it should be acknowledged that any movement of reform activities would eventually 
conflict with the more conservative powers of the Soviet system.  
Brzezinski and Huntington (1991) describe the way of policy initiation in the Soviet system as 
“trickle down”. In this system of elite politics, the Party’s Central Committee formulated policy 
initiatives, then mobilized resources, and monitored compliance where the crucial terrain of 
battle, the top leadership, was rather weak. Prior to 1989, Gorbachev personally took very 
little part in the discussions of economic reform. After the initial changes of personnel, which 
availed reformers more prominent positions, there was a return to more conservative 
influences as Gosplan and other central organs of the Council of Ministers proceeded to 
consolidate control of the reform commission (Aslund, 1990). At that time, the reformers tried 
to increase their power via the political reform program of democratization of the political 
system, through a new popularly elected legislature and more open public debates on policy 
issues. This should have provided a counterweight against the resistance to the reforms by 
the ministries and local party organizations (Cox, 1996). This resistance was already well 
organized in unions of industrialists and bankers on one side and as networks of party 
secretaries, such as the Siberian Agreement or the Big Volga Association arranging the 
interregional barter trade, on the other.  
By early 1989, however, economic reform was back on the agenda and was again attracting 
Gorbachev’s and other senior politicians’ attention mainly because of the growing awareness 
of the upcoming economic crisis despite the implemented policy actions. The party 
leadership realized that solutions to the problems needed to be sought through more radical 
steps. At the same time, it was becoming increasingly clear to the party leadership that if 
such a loosening of control were to be achieved, further moves would have to be introduced 
to limit the power of the economic “prosloika” formed by chief administrators in the economic 
ministries and their hold on the state enterprises. But support from the population was 
lacking, probably due to the anti-alcohol campaign introduced in Gorbachev’s first two years 
in power (Schroeder, 1992), which not only had a psychological effect but more importantly, it 
increased shortages on other goods, especially sugar for the production of self-made vodka 
(“samogonka”). The increasing scarcity of supplies started to shake the pillars on which the 
Soviet economic and political economy rested. Woodruff (1999) identified three pillars: 
1. Monetary system ensuring macroeconomic balance. 
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2. Vertical bargaining economy of the planned economy. 
3. Horizontal bargaining economy, which was organized by regional “apparatchiki” on a 
barter basis affirming the political weight of the Party. 
The first pillar corroded while the other two, in their principal nature, are still solidly standing. 
The only difference is that most rules of the formal game disappeared and that the number of 
actors increased. 
2.2 1992 to 1993: Shock Therapying Leads to a Free Falling Economy 
Gorbachev’s 500-day plan and Gaidar’s shock therapy are rooted in the same Soviet-style of 
economic thinking in the sense that they did not emerge from consultation with the people, 
parliament, and the already existing business community. The market reform package was 
launched in January 1992 just after the Soviet Union disintegrated. The federal deficit was 
reduced to zero from a former estimated high of 21%, according to the IMF. This was 
achieved mainly by a cutback in subsidies to consumers, industry and, very importantly, local 
governments. Military industry saw a reduction of funds by about 70% which, among others, 
contributed to a strong political polarization between the more technocratic team of reformers 
and the left-wing regulators. Surging inflation depleted individual savings and the social 
safety net and core governmental services disappeared. The shock therapy already failed in 
its initial state. Inflation control of the first month of 1992 did not endure beyond the fall of 
1992, because the microeconomic units did not respond to price signals according to market 
economy norms. Macroeconomic stabilization did not materialize mostly because monetary 
control, fiscal discipline, and foreign aid were actually harder to obtain than textbooks 
suggested.  
The government failed to build a fundamental consensus among the major political and 
economic actors to jointly build a civil society with market principles guiding economic 
exchange. Instead, Russia was managed by highly organized polito-economic business 
networks, which were guided by their own interests of rent extraction and political power. The 
control over politics and media should secure future rents and privileges.  
Trade liberalization opened vast windows of opportunities to transfer rents from mostly the 
natural wealth of Russia to the personal bank accounts of masterminds of polito-economic 
business networks. Trade liberalization not only lead to enormous capital flight through 
exports, but increasing import pressure systematically replaced Russian goods with imports 
from the domestic consumption basket, killing most of the industries that operated on the 
domestic market. Trade liberalization has to be seen combined with a real ruble appreciation 
by keeping the inflation rate ahead of the nominal depreciation rate, which not only turned 
out to be rather expensive but also hurt Russian producers. Import penetration had soon 
reached the level of 60–70%. Productive capacities were largely underutilized and failed, 
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and due to lacking revenues and increased costs were unable to allocate investment capital 
for restructuring. In addition, legal and political uncertainty did not create an inviting 
investment climate. 
Although the macro-economic variables were still triste, Boris Yeltsin gave the green light to 
the voucher privatization program that was launched in mid 1993. It was clear that private 
ownership would keep the momentum of reform going and the probability of returning to a 
Soviet-type regime would be reduced. In the first privatization wave, less productive and 
non-strategic assets were privatized. Due to the fact that money was earned through trade 
and on the speculative financial market, the interest in Russian industry was small and 
stocks were changing owners at “throw away” prices. It was also clear that efficiency 
changes were not to be expected from such an early privatization program, because 
restructuring industrial assets did not make quick and good money. More generally, it should 
be acknowledged that major stealing in Russia did not occur through privatization and 
owning assets, but through protected and monopolized arbitrage in trade and insider trade 
on speculative financial markets. Immediate returns on productivity gains in industrial 
production were too low to be attractive for investors thereby hampering effective 
restructuring. 
3. Data and Methodology 
Data stems originally from GOSKOMSTAT and were retrieved from IIASA’s socioeconomic 
database. Measures for output, labor and capital were available for 22 individual industry 
aggregates across all 89 subjects of the Russian Federation between 1987 and 1993 on a 
yearly basis. Industrial output on different aggregations was available from 1987 to 1997. 
This data set was, however, not used for the growth regressions. Large-scale 
inconsistencies in the statistical data increased over time. It is believed that the major 
tendencies already became apparent in 1993 when reporting was still better. The correlation 
of nominal output between 1993 and 1997 was 94%, which appears to be rather high. For a 
more detailed discussion on data issues see Kuboniwa (1999). 
Efficiency is measured by the use of a non-parametric method called Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and is described in greater detail in Obersteiner (1999) and Ali and Seiford 
(1994). Efficiency in the context of the analysis can briefly be described as the difference 
between the benchmark input-output relation defined by the computed production frontier 
surface and the actual input-output relation of each industry in each region. In other words, 
efficiency can be defined as the difference between the best practice or benchmark input-
output and actual input-output relation.  
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The parametric models that were applied are described in Greene (1993). The results of the 
estimation of Cobb-Douglas production functions are shown below. The more flexible 
translog production function and econometric frontier functions in both the Cobb-Douglas 
and translog functional form were also estimated with the purpose of estimating and 
comparing efficiency scores. It turned out that the econometric efficiency scores of regions 
and industries were only very weakly correlated with efficiency scores. The correlation 
coefficients between the DEA efficiencies and Cobb-Douglas efficiencies, using both the 
Battese and Coelli (1992) frontier function and the two way error component fixed effects 
model, did not exceed 10%. When we used the translog specification, it turned out that the 
estimated efficiencies were almost indistinguishably small. This suggests that the DEA 
envelopment hull (which envelops the surface of the data cloud) is significantly different from 
the production function (which is a fitted line through the average of the data cloud). The 
difference in the constructed benchmark surface might be related to outliers. However, the 
units that constructed the hull were not identified as outliers after individual inspection. Due 
to the fact that DEA is a non-parametric approach, which better fits applications in non-
competitive markets, we decided to continue with DEA efficiency scores, which also 
appeared to be plausible after individual inspection. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Output Decline between 1987 to 1997 
Table 1: Overview of nominal regional industrial output (Y) in million rubles, 
indicators of change, and share of industrial output in the economy. 











Russian Federation 511951668 1582998193 0.4703   0.5516 
Adygei Rep. 724588 1059829 0.2225 0.0004 0.5287 0.3560 
Altai Rep. 121573 163721 0.2048 0.0000 0.4868 0.0763 
Altai T. 7412970 15326339 0.3144 0.0087 0.7474 0.5807 
Amur Reg. 1663044 5495988 0.5026 0.0042 1.1946 0.2778 
Arkhangelsk Reg. 4786433 12657444 0.4022 0.0087 0.9559 0.6608 
Astrakhan Reg. 2022832 4541207 0.3414 0.0028 0.8115 0.4833 
Bashkortostan Rep. 15016302 48187891 0.4881 0.0366 1.1600 0.8480 
Belgorod Reg. 3945744 15413436 0.5941 0.0127 1.4120 0.8868 
Bryansk Reg. 5036741 5869673 0.1772 0.0009 0.4213 0.4485 
Buryat Rep. 2254368 5976267 0.4032 0.0041 0.9583 0.5207 
Chelyabinsk Reg. 18144436 53580696 0.4491 0.0391 1.0674 0.9806 
Chita Reg. 1879625 5117724 0.4141 0.0036 0.9842 0.3450 
Chuvash Rep. 4095314 7967493 0.2959 0.0043 0.7033 0.6968 
Irkutsk Reg. 10956657 31357464 0.4353 0.0225 1.0345 0.6427 
Ivanovo Reg. 7973903 7145001 0.1363 -0.0009 0.3239 0.7296 
Kabardino-Balkar Rep. 1800846 2405397 0.2031 0.0007 0.4828 0.3967 
Kaliningrad Reg. 2780207 4832096 0.2643 0.0023 0.6283 0.4783 
Kalmyk Rep. 255324 664737 0.3960 0.0005 0.9411 0.3564 
Kaluga Reg. 3076598 6438350 0.3183 0.0037 0.7565 0.5350 
Kamchatka Reg. 2054756 5509844 0.4078 0.0038 0.9693 0.6599 
Karachai-Cherkess 
Rep. 
903390 1288605 0.2169 0.0004 0.5156 0.4938 
Kemerovo Reg. 12094969 41392376 0.5205 0.0324 1.2371 0.8925 
Khabarovsk T. 6144100 13570212 0.3359 0.0082 0.7984 0.5269 
Khakass Rep. 2111018 5302808 0.3820 0.0035 0.9080 0.7175 
Kirov Reg. 5207153 11863394 0.3465 0.0074 0.8235 0.6711 
Komi Rep. 3799861 15515984 0.6210 0.0129 1.4760 0.5346 
Kostroma Reg. 2479819 5430294 0.3330 0.0033 0.7916 0.6036 
Krasnodar T. 10216956 19983508 0.2975 0.0108 0.7070 0.3682 
Krasnoyarsk T. 13759101 49789938 0.5504 0.0398 1.3081 0.7473 
Kurgan Reg. 2907132 5748638 0.3007 0.0031 0.7148 0.5792 
Kursk Reg. 4213294 11482592 0.4145 0.0080 0.9851 0.7284 
Leningrad Reg. 5891792 14869716 0.3838 0.0099 0.9123 0.7346 
Lipetsk Reg. 4893602 19635209 0.6102 0.0163 1.4504 1.1922 
Magadan Reg. 2095166 4371196 0.3173 0.0025 0.7542 0.5137 
Primorsky T. 6949301 18846667 0.4125 0.0131 0.9803 0.6777 
Mariy El Rep. 1762395 3747427 0.3234 0.0022 0.7686 0.5599 
Moscow 30726608 96622182 0.4782 0.0728 1.1367 0.3023 
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Moscow Reg. 25297898 40208581 0.2417 0.0165 0.5745 0.5774 
Murmansk Reg. 5074920 16629274 0.4984 0.0128 1.1845 0.8021 
Nizhny Novgorod Reg. 15785347 41512489 0.4000 0.0284 0.9506 0.6984 
North Ossetian Rep. 1500072 1406355 0.1426 -0.0001 0.3389 0.0000 
Novgorod Reg. 2181780 6165770 0.4298 0.0044 1.0215 0.6990 
Novosibirsk Reg. 8050951 16042117 0.3030 0.0088 0.7203 0.4638 
Omsk Reg. 7528355 24458058 0.4941 0.0187 1.1744 0.6570 
Orel Reg. 2978887 9197920 0.4696 0.0069 1.1161 2.5440 
Orenburg Reg. 7718354 23205539 0.4573 0.0171 1.0868 0.1651 
Penza Reg. 3955835 8278740 0.3183 0.0048 0.7565 0.5830 
Perm Reg. 11726824 38607950 0.5007 0.0297 1.1901 0.6805 
Pskov Reg. 2064777 3337913 0.2459 0.0014 0.5844 0.4793 
Rep. Dagestan 1946811 1751922 0.1369 -0.0002 0.3253 0.1917 
Rep. Karelia 2537987 7139800 0.4278 0.0051 1.0169 0.7149 
Rep. Mordovia 2731626 5774916 0.3215 0.0034 0.7642 0.6067 
Rostov Reg. 12640674 23006876 0.2768 0.0114 0.6579 0.7250 
Ryazan Reg. 5632502 10628435 0.2870 0.0055 0.6821 0.7520 
Sakha Rep. 2813193 16935893 0.9156 0.0156 2.1761 0.5275 
Sakhalin Reg. 2711235 6196065 0.3476 0.0038 0.8261 0.6192 
Samara Reg. 15010733 56864099 0.5761 0.0462 1.3694 0.8003 
Saratov Reg. 8152187 16722332 0.3120 0.0095 0.7415 0.4341 
Smolensk Reg. 3932667 7883648 0.3049 0.0044 0.7246 0.6680 
St. Petersburg 18868697 37381323 0.3013 0.0204 0.7161 0.5271 
Stavropol T. 5206848 11452744 0.3345 0.0069 0.7951 0.5369 
Sverdlovsk Reg. 22721349 64424443 0.4312 0.0461 1.0249 0.8429 
Tambov Reg. 3773958 5494390 0.2214 0.0019 0.5263 0.5689 
Tatarstan Rep. 14754678 49948068 0.5148 0.0389 1.2237 0.6786 
Tomsk Reg. 2591530 10926669 0.6412 0.0092 1.5241 0.6334 
Tula Reg. 7391922 15255241 0.3139 0.0087 0.7460 0.5886 
Tuva Rep. 211380 371790 0.2675 0.0002 0.6358 0.2469 
Tver Reg. 5625697 11409342 0.3084 0.0064 0.7331 0.8970 
Tyumen Reg. 19527105 128394705 1.0000 0.1202 2.3768 0.5518 
Udmurt Rep. 5604944 15719397 0.4265 0.0112 1.0138 0.6847 
Ulyanovsk Reg. 5120323 13801886 0.4100 0.0096 0.9744 0.8126 
Vladimir Reg. 7986985 12764041 0.2431 0.0053 0.5777 0.8519 
Volgograd Reg. 9517505 21790021 0.3482 0.0136 0.8276 0.7039 
Vologda Reg. 5741050 24994908 0.6621 0.0213 1.5738 1.1672 
Voronezh Reg. 7252177 15384723 0.3226 0.0090 0.7668 0.6007 
Yaroslavl Reg. 6558793 17398543 0.4034 0.0120 0.9589 0.8214 
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. The index of change is the normalized relative growth of nominal industrial 
output between 1987 and 1997. The contribution of change can be interpreted as the 
region’s contribution to the nominal change of industrial output of all regions, and finally the 
shift share is just the ration of the region’s contribution to total industrial output to that of the 
Russian Federation between 1997 and 1987. The share of industry output on regional GDP 
in 1996 provides some light on serious data uncertainties. A share larger than one is, by 
definition, not possible and a share of the service sector (not industry) of over 40% in major 
northern oil drilling regions, such as Tyumen, are very doubtful. This means that errors, 
which are usually assumed to be equal across all regions (e.g., share of gray economy), are 
unlikely to exhibit consistent properties. Thus, data analysis can and should only be used to 
a limited extent for empirical verification purposes for any kind of theoretical reasoning. It is 
also highly questionable to draw any kind of useful policy conclusions from empirical 
analysis. The application of econometric models for causality testing should be avoided. 
However, it is observed that data uncertainties and their scientific consequences are rarely 
discussed among transition economists. 
Table 2: Overview of nominal industry output (Y in 1987 and 1997) in million rubles, 
indicators of change, and share of industrial output in the economy. 
 Y_1987 Y_1997 Index of 
change 
Contribution  







Chemical 36340488 91849472 0.24 5.56 0.845883   7.24   6.12 
Construction 19274765 57696768 0.28 3.85 1.001814   3.84   3.85 
Electric power 22333965 238502307 1.00 21.66 3.573973   4.45 15.90 
Ferrous metallurgy 28910246 242249660 0.78 21.37 2.804374   5.76 16.15 
Flour 12781697 29216147 0.21 1.65 0.764996   2.55   1.95 
Food 64606032 172319088 0.25 10.79 0.892657 12.87 11.49 
Forest 28657300 51463388 0.17 2.28 0.601018   5.71   3.43 
Fuel 44092793 248502307 0.53 20.48 1.886198   8.78 16.56 
Glass 1595632 4361151 0.26 0.28 0.91473   0.32   0.29 
Light 62996849 32438229 0.05 -3.06 0.172331 12.55   2.16 
Machine 1.56E+08 254900524 0.15 9.94 0.547926 31.01 16.99 
Non-ferrous metal 24802130 76717896 0.29 5.20 1.035219   4.94   5.11 
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The results from Table 1, covering the performance of the individual subjects of the Russian 
Federation, are directly linked to the industrial structure. It can be seen that regions, which 
are endowed with exploitable and exportable natural resources, such as Tyumen (oil), Sakha 
(non-ferrous metal and diamonds, and Komi (fuel, forest, electricity), are leading (see 
industrial structure, Table 3). Regions, which are mainly dependent on the food industry, 
machine building, traditional chemical industry and light industry are losing. From Table 2, it 
can be seen that the light industry, thus, regions depending on the light industry (e.g., 
Ivanov), faced the sharpest decline. Machine building and forest industry follow the light 
industry as under-performers. Further characteristics are that under-performing regions are 
either regions with a high non-Russian and low educated population or regions with a high 
share of agriculture and/or large share of military industry. It appears that only the city of 
Moscow, which was probably also a military industry center previously, managed to avoid a 
dramatic industrial decline. Moscow could profit from the ‘entry port’ effect and spillovers 
from the financial and service economy. 
Table 3:  Industrial structure (in percent of industrial regional output in 1996) of the 
top 10 and bottom 10 regions. 








Flour Food For- 
estry 






Tyumen Reg.   1.1   1.6 10.2   0.0 0.7  2.3   1.0 80.2 0.0 0.3   2.4   0.0 0.2 
Sakha (Yakut) 
Republic  
 0.0   3.4 12.4   0.1 0.0  7.6   1.5 16.4 0.0 0.4   2.2 54.5 1.5 
Vologda Reg.   6.7 11.8  9.9 51.4 1.0  5.7   5.9   0.5 0.3 0.7   5.2   0.2 0.7 
Tomsk Reg.  22.6   4.4 11.9   0.3 2.6  6.5   4.3 33.9 0.1 0.3 11.4   0.0 1.7 
Komi Republic   0.0   4.1 20.0   0.0 0.1  5.5 16.5 46.9 0.0 1.7   3.2   0.0 2.0 
Lipetsk Reg.   1.1   3.5 12.9 56.4 1.3  9.5   0.2   0.0 0.0 0.4 14.0   0.0 0.7 
Belgorod Reg.   2.4   8.1 13.2 41.5 2.6 16.6   0.6   0.0 0.0 0.7 13.7   0.0 0.6 
Samara Reg.   9.6   3.1 11.8   0.1 1.3  6.7   0.6 12.5 0.1 0.6 51.3   1.7 0.6 
Krasnoyarsk T.   7.2   3.4 12.2   0.7 1.2  6.7   6.2 11.1 0.0 0.8   6.2 42.6 1.7 
Kemerovo Reg.   6.0   3.4 12.3 28.6 1.3  4.9   1.1 31.0 0.2 0.6   6.7   2.8 1.1 
Bottom 10              
Ivanovo Reg.   3.2   3.2 21.0 0.0 3.0 16.6   2.9   0.1 0.0 32.6 16.5   0.0 0.9 
Republic Dagestan   2.8 14.5 21.6 0.0 5.6 18.6   0.7 15.4 1.1  1.1 16.9   0.0 1.7 
Bryansk Reg.   0.6 12.0 12.7 0.8 4.8 22.8   5.6   0.2 2.6  2.9 29.6   0.0 5.4 
Kabardino-Balkar 
Republic 
  0.3   7.4 24.2 0.0 4.3 21.8   0.8   0.0 0.0  5.4 29.9   3.2 2.7 
Altai Republic   1.4 11.8   0.0 0.0 0.4 43.0 12.8   0.0 0.0  5.4   7.1 15.2 2.9 
KarachaiCherkess 
Republic 
26.2 29.2 14.8 0.0 0.6 16.1   2.3   0.4 0.0  1.5   6.4   1.6 0.9 
Tambov Reg. 16.3   4.9 20.4 0.2 5.4 22.9   1.6   0.0 0.0  3.4 24.1   0.0 0.8 
Adygei Republic   0.7   8.3 10.0 0.0 3.5 43.5 14.3   1.6 0.0  0.8 12.9   0.0 4.4 
Moscow Reg.   9.5   9.2   9.5 3.7 3.4 14.7   4.3   0.2 0.9  7.1 33.4   2.5 1.6 
Vladimir Reg.   4.6   4.8 18.0 0.7 2.5   9.5   4.4   0.4 5.0  6.6 39.2   2.5 1.8 
Pskov Reg.   0.1   5.1 18.1 0.1 3.8 22.8   4.1   0.1 0.5  5.7 35.9   0.1 3.6 
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5. Efficiency Estimations with DEA 
5.1 Efficiency  
Table 4:  Average and standard deviation of efficiency across all industries and 
regions in 1987 and 1993. 
Model Year Weighted Average Weighted Standard Deviation 
CRS 1987 0.212276 0.173184 
 1993 0.165625 0.218403 
VRS 1987 0.517159 0.365533 
 1993 0.642567 0.382588 
Scale 1987 0.304883 0.192349 
 1993 0.476942 0.164185 
 
From Table 4, it is not possible to judge whether the aggregate efficiency gains can be 
observed in the course of transition. DEA is unit invariant, i.e., up and down scaling of all 
variables does not matter, however, in our model the output and capital measures were 
dramatically changing during the inflationary period after 1991, whereas labor, which is a 
physical measure, was not subject to re-scaling. This made it impossible to pool the data and 
infer efficiency changes over time. The input/output relations also changed dramatically as 
shown in Section 6.  
Thus, what we observe in Table 4 is the average distance of all regional industries to the 
best practice technology in a particular year. Due to the large sample size, the difference in 
the mean efficiency between 1987 and 1993 is significant on a 99% confidence interval 
using the Student t-test. However, the direction of change is apparently dependent on the 
model used. In the CRS case average efficiency declined and in the VRS model the 
efficiency improved with the introduction of market principles. This result is due to differences 
of the efficient hull constructed by the CRS and the VRS model.  
We can conclude from Table 4 that shock therapy led to a more diverse industry structure 
(increase in the standard deviation of efficiency) although, on average, the relative distance 
of inefficient industries to the best practice industries did not change. When we try to split 
efficiency into inefficiencies of scale and technical inefficiency, we find that efficiency of scale 
increased suggesting that new prices and output decline rendered gigantic production less 
competitive. Output decline, however, made large inefficient industries more economically 
viable through size adjustment. This is in line with the results of an increase in the 
economies of scale measured by the production function approach below and by the fact 
that concentrated industries  usually gigantic on the enterprise level  declined more 
rapidly.  
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5.2 Efficiencies and the Regions 
Table 5: Correlation between change in regional output (Y), industrial labor force (L), 
and industrial fixed capital stock (K) between 1987 and 1993, and absolute 
weighted efficiency (Eff_), change in weighted efficiency (Eff_ _87-Eff_ _93) 
and weighted standard deviations (S.D. Eff_) using a region/industry panel 
(1120 observations) and DEA (Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) and Constant 
Returns to Scale (CRS)). 
 Y_87/Y_93 L_87/L_93 K_87/K_93 
Eff_VRS_87 0.0669 -0,1001 0.138164 
Eff_VRS_93 -0.4644 0,0541 0.042676 
Eff_CRS_87 0.1163 -0,1583 0.447872 
Eff_CRS_93 -0.3665 0,0117 0.135165 
Eff_VRS_87-Eff_VRS_93 0.7083 -0.18669 0.102903 
Eff_CRS_87-Eff_CRS_93 0.4671 -0.14811 0.253886 
S.D. Eff_VRS_87 0.1162 -0.11595 0.140638 
S.D. Eff_VRS_93 -0.4598 0.077588 0.068244 
S.D. Eff_CRS_87 0.0867 -0.17264 0.412648 
S.D. Eff_CRS_93 -0.2968 -0.02719 0.107941 
 
5.2.1 Output Decline 
· Little correlation between efficiency in 1987 and output decline; the positive sign 
indicates that regions that were more efficient in 1987 declined faster (Eff_87, 
Y_87/Y_93). 
· There is a strong negative correlation between the efficiency in 1993 and output decline; 
the negative sign indicates that regions that were efficient in 1993 declined slower 
(Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). 
· The strongest correlation can be found between the change in efficiency and change in 
output; regions that improved in terms of efficiency were able to decline slower (Eff_87-
Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). 
· Regions that allowed for more diversity between industries within the region declined 
slower (SD Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). 
5.2.2 Labor Market 
Overall there is weak correlation between efficiency indicators and labor force developments. 
The correlation tends to indicate that regions that were more successful in moving people 
out of the industrial labor force gained efficiency. 
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5.2.3 Fixed Capital 
The change in capital stock seems to be higher correlated with efficiency indicators in 1987. 
This indicates that regions that were endowed with high productive assets (possibly more 
modern assets) were able to devalue these assets faster than regions with less productive 
assets. This might reflect differences in the political power of different regions. During 1993, 
the first privatization waves started and managers had an incentive to devalue the assets 
they wanted to take over. However, those regions that were able to improve in terms of 
efficiency were endowed with assets that were not easily depreciable. Highly diverse regions 
in terms of efficiency in 1987 depreciated capital faster. 
5.3 Efficiency and Industry 
Table 6: Correlation between change in industry output, labor and capital between 
1987 and 1993 and absolute weighted efficiency, change in weighted 
efficiency and weighted standard deviations using a region/industry panel 
and DEA. 
 Y_87/Y_93 L_87/L_93 K_87/K_93 
Eff_VRS_87 -0.00393 -0.23985 -0.20262 
Eff_VRS_93 -0.35742 -0.38591 -0.37648 
Eff_CRS_87 -0.08196 -0.3598 -0.24844 
Eff_CRS_93 -0.37342 -0.31965 -0.31976 
Eff_VRS_87-Eff_VRS_93 0.502186 0.186421 0.229243 
Eff_CRS_87-Eff_CRS_93 0.17719 -0.24235 -0.09077 
S.D. Eff_VRS_87 0.140948 -0.05028 0.01897 
S.D. Eff_VRS_93 -0.27929 -0.27694 -0.2921 
S.D. Eff_CRS_87 -0.04556 -0.28885 -0.16921 
S.D. Eff_CRS_93 -0.38631 -0.36248 -0.3194 
 
5.3.1 Output Decline 
· There is little correlation between efficiency on the industry level in 1987 and output 
decline (Eff_87, Y_87/Y_93). This suggests that output decline cannot be related to 
initial efficiencies of industries. 
· There is a strong negative correlation between the efficiency in 1993 and output decline; 
the negative sign indicates that industries that were efficient in 1993 declined slower 
(Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). 
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· The strongest correlation can be found between the change in efficiency and change in 
output; industries that improved in terms of efficiency were able to decline slower 
(Eff_87-Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). 
· Industries that allowed for more diversity in terms of efficiency across the regions 
declined slower (SD Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). 
5.3.2 Labor Market 
Overall, there is a strong correlation between efficiency indicators and labor force 
developments on the industry level. The correlation shows that industries that were more 
efficient were able to discharge fewer people or were even able to absorb additional labor. 
More diverse industries in terms of efficiency were, on the whole, able to retain more labor.  
5.3.3 Fixed Capital 
The change in capital stock seems to be strongly correlated with efficiency indicators in 1993 
and 1987. This means that industries that were endowed with highly efficient assets 
compared to other industries were able to devalue these assets slower than industries with 
less efficient assets. This seems surprising due to the high importance of industrial lobbying 
in the political power game, but the most efficient and productive assets were still in the 
hands of the government, which might explain this empirical fact. During 1993, the first 
privatization waves started and managers had an incentive to devalue the assets they 
wanted to take over. However, in the first wave only less productive assets were privatized. 
Those industries that were able to improve in terms of efficiency were endowed with assets 
that were not easily depreciable. The increase in efficiency must thus reflect price changes of 
the industrial output. Highly diverse industries in terms of efficiency in 1993 depreciated 
capital slower. 
5.4 Efficiency and Market Change 
5.4.1 Output Decline 
· There is little correlation between efficiency in 1987 and output decline (Eff_87, 
Y_87/Y_93) on both regional and industry levels. This suggests that the hypothesis that 
output decline can not be related to initial efficiencies must be accepted i.e. under the 
planned economy, economic efficiency was significantly different from what market 
conditions would predict. 
· There is a strong negative correlation between efficiency in 1993 and output decline; the 
negative correlation indicates that those regions and industries that became efficient in 
1993 declined slower (Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). Of course, the high correlation is, in part, 
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explained by the fact that efficiency improvements are also directly related to output 
changes. 
· The strongest correlation can be found between the change in efficiency and change in 
output; industries/regions that improved in terms of efficiency were able to decline slower 
(Eff_87-Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). Again, it should be kept in mind that efficiency and output 
are not independent of each other. 
· Industries/regions that allowed for more diversity in terms of efficiency declined slower 
(SD Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). Cross-subsidies to equalize relative productivity result in being 
ineffective — a lesson we also had to learn in other parts of the world. 
5.4.2 Labor Market 
There is a negative correlation between the standard deviation of efficiency and a change in 
labor for both region and industry in 1987. This is an argument for restructuring 
industries/regions if labor mobility within the industry/regions is possible (geographic 
restriction). It appears that in ‘winning’ regions/industry the labor market is rather flexible both 
in terms of inter-industry (including the service sector, i.e., exiting industry) and geographic 
mobility. High labor mobility might be related to the relatively high education levels of the 
labor force in such regions/industries. 
5.4.3 Fixed Capital 
Initially, it would appear that the results of the correlation of change in the value and 
efficiency assets among regions and industries seem to be contradictory. The correlation 
coefficients between the capital ratio and levels and the standard deviation of efficiency 
show different directions, while changes in efficiency are positively related to capital 
depreciation. This inconsistency indicates that the system of ‘economica soglasovanii’ 
(negotiated economy: requires that economic policy and the allocation of economic 
resources be determined by representatives of the major sectoral interests according to 
formal procedures of negotiation (Fortescue, 1997)) collapsed and the fate of economic 
power shifted to particular regions with specific industrial constellations. In other words, 
economic success can be better understood by looking at the (industrial) geography of 
Russia rather than looking at different sectors separately.  
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5.5 Market Structure and Efficiency 
5.5.1 Concentration 
We measure concentration by the Herfindahl index, which is equal to the sum of squares of 
the market shares. For the computation of the correlation in Table 7, a region specific 
Herfindahl index is calculated. It is a weighted index with the region’s specific industry output 
as the weight.  
Table 7: Correlation between the weighted (industry output as weight) Herfindahl 











S.D. Eff_VRS_87 0.388036 
S.D. Eff_VRS_93 0.21038 
S.D. Eff_CRS_87 0.600324 
S.D. Eff_CRS_93 0.048244 
 
The main result from Table 7 is that regions that hosted more concentrated industries in 
1987 declined faster. Regions with concentrated industries were able to devalue their fixed 
assets at a higher rate than other regions. A higher devaluation of the physical capital might 
be due to scale inefficiencies. Changes in labor are not correlated with concentration, 
indicating that large-scale production complexes, which are usually of town forming 
character, showed a more paternalistic management style, which led to labor hoarding. 
However, during 1991–1993 labor hoarding was common practice and gave enterprise 
directors a stronger weight in negotiation over subsidies. Labor was employed, though hardly 
paid, which led workers to search for opportunities outside the enterprise without officially 
leaving the company. Efficiency was higher correlated with the Herfindahl index in 1987 than 
in 1993, which is another indication that size became less of a comparative advantage. 
There is also a decrease in the correlation between the standard deviation of efficiency and 
concentration.  
Initial efficiency is positively related to concentration. Regions with more concentrated 
industries were favored in the old system of a planned economy. The price and subsidy 
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scheme of the planned economy overvalued scale effects — gigantophily. This might 
however, be related to the fact that most concentrated industries were located in remote 
areas of Siberia and scale effects were becoming effective only by providing services 
(schools, duties of municipalities, etc.) — a factor that is completely ignored in classical 
economic analysis. Industrial production in remote areas was severely hit by the economic 
reform package, which abandoned transport subsidies overnight. Thus, concentration might 
also be measuring the physical distance to the market. 
Regions with more concentrated industry were more diverse with respect to efficiency, i.e., 
one or more large and (in-)efficient leader industries were surrounded by inefficient 
industries, producing (food, construction materials, etc.). However, as prices started to adapt 
the difference in efficiency disappeared (probably by passing the cost of (in-) efficiency to the 
up-and-down stream industries).  
6. Regression Results 
For the computation of the regression results shown in Tables 8 and 9 regional industrial 
output growth was regressed against efficiency change (VRS and CRS), change of the 
Herfindahl concentration index and the localization index. The model was estimated in 
logarithms and the change was measured between 1987 and 1993.  
Table 8: Growth regression (R2=0.71, D.F. = 1036) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] Mean of X 
VRS efficiency  
   score 
0.6308198 0.24559E-01 25.686 0.00000 0.3225 
Herfinadahl  
   concentration  
   index 
-0.1817912E-01 0.32359E-02 -5.618 0.00000 -7.779 
Localization  
   index 
0.4453849 0.23729E-01 18.769 0.00000 0.2260E-
01 
 
Table 9: Growth regression (R2=0.72, D.F. = 1036) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St.Er P[|Z|>z] Mean of X 
CRS efficiency  
   score 
0.6233491 0.22907E-01 27.213 0.00000 0.2860 
Herfinadahl  
   concentration  
   index 
-0.6988807E-02 0.31838E-02 -2.195 0.02816 -7.779 
Localization  
   index 
0.4483160 0.22905E-01 19.572 0.00000 0.2260E-01 
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Economic growth or slow decline is, according to the regression results, positively related to 
efficiency gains, negatively associated with concentration, and regions benefit if they host 
localized industries. Coefficients are almost identical for both models. Due to the large 
sample size, all coefficients are statistically significant. 
The localization index is computed by the ratio between the industry’s share in a particular 
region and the industry’s share in the nation. There is also indication that efficiency 
improvement is associated with increased localization. In addition, more localized regions, 
those who were already or had become localized, performed better both in output measures 
and discarding labor. 
In both regression models, over 70% of the variation of the growth pattern was captured by 
the simple linear model using the change of efficiency, concentration and localization. The 
model was estimated as a two-way error component fixed effects model with region and 
industry dummies as effects. 
7. Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Production 
Functions from 1987 to 1993 
A common production function, Cobb-Douglas, was estimated over all of the regions and 
industries. The purpose of the estimation is to find indications of shifts in the contribution of 
the two major input factors, labor and capital, to output and to estimate economies of scale in 
industrial production. There are two interesting results from the estimation of the Cobb-
Douglas production function of industry aggregates on the regional scale. It is assumed that 
the coefficients are time dependent and panels were estimated across regions and industries 
for each year individually. It can be concluded that the initial shock therapy led to (see also 
Figure 1): 
1. An increase in the economies of scale by some 10%, and 
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2. a decrease in the capital share and increase in labor share, both by some 30%. 
8. Discussion 
8.1 Efficiency and Market Structure 
Changes in efficiency, as defined by the model, can occur for various reasons. During 
transition, Russian industries were exposed to both supply and demand sided shocks. These 
shocks altered the relative competitive position of industries and regions measured in 
efficiency terms. Price liberalization changed the cost of labor, the cost of intermediary inputs 
and raw materials, cost and value of assets, and finally the cost of transportation. 
Liberalization also meant that monopolies could exercise market power. This especially 
applies to the energy and transportation sector. The revelation of the real costs for energy 
and transportation, in combination with exercised monopoly power, had great impacts on the 
geography of industrial production in the resource-based (assets are non-transferable) 








1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Coef. labor Coef. Capital L+C
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economy of Russia. It should be noted that these monopolies did not appear in our analysis 
as concentrated industries; on the contrary, utilities are ubiquitous. Monopolies were not only 
present in the energy and transportation sector, but at least equally important was the 
monopoly on information. Monopolies on information are hardly discussed in the economic 
analysis on transition. However, information constraints played an important role at a time 
when supply chains started to disintegrate and domestic and foreign trade activities were 
channeled through specific trade organizations. These organizations were partly inherited 
from the past or were created from existing structures, which were either of criminal nature 
or a network of bureaucrats and technocrats who converted their former political power into 
an economic asset.  
With the emergence of barter trade as one of the major forms of non-monetary payment 
leading to a demonetization of the economy, large enterprise arrears came into place. Barter 
trade had detrimental effects on the efficiency of enterprise operations and not only had 
adverse effects on the current inefficiency of enterprises but also, and probably more 
importantly, created incentives to avoid restructuring and invited rent extraction instead. Also, 
the governments’ willingness to accept soft goods as tax offsets, that is to give additional 
incentives to avoid restructuring or not restructure at all. Output, for which there was large 
import pressure and declining purchasing power of domestic consumers, could still be 
produced in the barter economy. In addition, due to a number of reasons, which are mainly 
related to the continuation of paternalistic principles of relational enterprise networks, many 
economically non-viable products continued to be produced, although one has to admit that 
rapid trade liberalization led to excessive import pressure leaving domestic producers with 
no competitive edge. Furthermore, industries relying on intermediary inputs had to increase 
their inventories, which depleted resources for other company activities. All these factors 
questioned the value and interpretability of the results gained from monetary output 
measures. However, we were more interested in the factors determining the relative 
competitiveness of an industry or region rather than growth accounting. In this respect our 
results are somewhat more informative. 
Inefficiencies arise when capacities are under-utilized due to a lack in demand. The under-
utilization of capacities is the main source of inefficiency. In 1996, the index of physical 
output relative to the 1990 level for the Russian Federation was down to 48% (GosKomStat, 
1997), which is way below the optimal level. Thus, although the DEA results are not 
conclusive with respect to efficiency gains, it can be concluded that transition due to the 
historically unprecedented industrial decline triggered by major fall backs of demand, did 
bring about large-scale absolute inefficiencies. However, relative scale efficiencies improved, 
as shown in Table 4. Demand shocks arose from a fall in domestic purchasing power due to 
inflation, changes in the preferences of consumers and changes of the goods basket 
towards foreign goods. So, for example, the physical production of meat declined in 1996 to 
30% — the same level as in 1990. The removal of barriers to international trade caused an 
increase in output for certain exporting industries, whereas other industries had to compete 
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with foreign producers on the domestic market, resulting in a reduced market share on the 
domestic market. Market penetration of imported consumer goods was estimated to increase 
by 70% before August 1998. Afterwards, domestic consumer goods could increase their 
share by some 50%. 
Apart from changes in the macro-economic conditions, sector policies changed considerably. 
In the system of a planned economy specific sectors, industries and regions were favored 
over others through inter alia cross-subsidies, regulations (including taxes), and artificial 
prices. The new economic conditions changed the preferences for certain sectors and 
regions considerably. The most important and drastic change was budgetary cuts to support 
military and space projects. There was hardly any civil production that was not designed to 
be immediately adapted for military purposes.4 The geographic weight of attention changed 
to be more Russian centered and depended upon the affinity to certain Kremlin circles. The 
policy measures taken to support industry in the post Soviet period were achieved from 
subsidies within sector programs, tax exemptions, special foreign trade allowances and 
recalculations in charges for natural resource exploitation. There are many more policy 
measures and equally important dysfunctioning or non-existent government functions and 
services that are described elsewhere and need not be repeated here. 
8.2 Production Function 
A number of explanations are possible in interpreting the increase in the degree of scale 
economies in industrial production. The first explanation would be that, under the Soviet 
system, the price structure was such that economies of scale did not become apparent in the 
regional industry statistics. The reason for this might be politically motivated since the 
existence of economies of scale would have meant that a certain industry should be 
preferably located in a certain region, which would have disequilibriated the political power 
among regional/industrial leaders. The other explanation is that assets were devalued faster 
in large regional industries. This claim would support the view that the powerful regional 
elites would have tried to devalue their assets as much as possible to prepare for a cheap 
takeover in the upcoming voucher privatization. However, the correlation between the level 
of output and change in the value of capital was very weak and negative. There was, 
however, stronger correlation (-0.14%) between the output in 1993 and the ratio between 
capital in 1987 and 1993, suggesting that larger regional industries could, on a relative scale, 
maintain higher prices for output than the capital used. 
Another aspect that we already mentioned, is that production of social services were 
discontinued or entrusted to the municipalities, which revealed the true production properties 
of industrial production. It should be noticed that the revelation of scale economies goes 
hand-in-hand with output decline. Assets that were used for military purposes or were simply 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 The most illustrative example is that cigarette producers could immediately be converted into ammunition factories. 
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obsolete were written off and the remaining assets now show this property as increasing 
returns to scale. The existence of increasing returns will lead to higher specialization and 
concentration of industrial production and increasing disparity of industrial success within the 
subjects of the Russian Federation. As industrial success can mainly be observed in 
resource extracting industries and such industries and regions respectively have little 
incentive to share revenues with the rest of Russia, one can predict that disputes over 
royalties and tax exceptions and their distribution will increasingly lead to tensions between 
the resource rich hard currency generating regions/industries and the central government, 
which for political reasons will want to try to equalize the gap between poor and rich through 
transfers. Such disputes have proved to be especially severe when combined with ethnic 
tensions. It can thus be further predicted that, if the Russian economy continues to be 
dominated by mainly resource extracting industries, the Federation will further disintegrate 
and ethnic tensions will continue to rise. This makes Russia more vulnerable in blaming the 
enemies of the Russian people to be responsible for the disintegration of the nation. Only 
under the scenario that Russia will increasingly be able to tap its human capital — Russia 
has one of the highest rates of tertiary education in the world — by restructuring its 
manufacturing sector and building a high tech service sector, will Russia be able to preserve 
its integrity and become an economic partner for the world economy.  
Unlike resource extraction, manufacturing and services benefit from economic openness and 
integration. The ‘Russian evil’ was killed successfully with shock therapy and negligence in 
post shock medication, but the ones that understand the psychology of the Russian people 
will know that, like Rasputin, Russia can and will come back to fight for its place in the world. 
Certainly we still have the choice to help Russia become an economic power or help Russia 
become a political military power. Both options can be achieved through trade and 
investment. When we look at the sheer number of financial and trade flows in and out of 
Russia, we discover that both international organizations operating in Russia and 
international businesses successfully govern Russia towards the second option. 
Another interesting finding that is related to the computation of production functions is the 
diverging trajectory of capital and labor coefficients. This can mostly be attributed to the fact 
that the value of total capital changed 6.2 times faster than the value of total output. There 
are a number of possible explanations for this diverging speed.  
· Much of the capital assets were still kept in the Soviet books but were not employed 
anymore and had to be written off. In addition, assets used for military purposes or 
combined military-commercial purposes had to be reassessed (in 1992 military spending 
was cut by about 70%). 
· The value of capital was simply overpricing in the planned economy with respect to its 
real market value. Thus, capital indicators were just accounting numbers during the 
Soviet period with little economic meaning for the underlying assets. 
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· The value of capital was intentionally de-(under-)valued to speed up privatization. 
9. Conclusions 
Our findings about the transition process in Russia indicate that: 
· Due to a lack in demand for domestic products, large scale under-utilization of capacities 
led to an increase of inefficiencies in industrial production. 
· Highly concentrated industries declined faster. 
· Localized industries declined slower. 
· Regions that allowed for higher inter-industry diversity, in terms of efficiency, declined 
slower. 
· Properties of the production function exhibit constant returns to scale until 1991. 
Thereafter, we observe a dramatic decline of the capital coefficient while the labor 
coefficient increases. After 1991, the production function exhibits increasing returns to 
scale properties. 
· Value of installed capital decreased 6.2 times faster than the value of output over the 
period 1987 to 1993. 
In conclusion, we can assert that the initial ambitions of the economics textbook recipes did 
not materialize. Shock therapy, which was followed by a slowing reform process due to 
Kremlin power politics, led to the primitivization of the Russian industry. With few exceptions, 
the exploitation of natural resources became the main sources of revenue. A myriad of 
factors — e.g., unpredictable macro-economic environment with high and stochastic inflation 
and appreciating real exchange rates, the malfunctioning court system, unclear property 
rights, lack of market information and business support systems, uncertain and ineffective 
political leadership combined with historically deep rooted suspicion against the state, 
lacking internal competition and overwhelming import competition, etc. — left the Russian 
industry largely noncompetitive on the domestic and international market for its 
manufactured goods.  
In the last ten years, virtually no restructuring and investment happened, both in terms of 
human and physical capital building, which created an endogenous dynamic of the economic 
system that tends more toward an under-development trap than toward full economic 
recovery. Only a strong political leadership or large international aid packages, combined 
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with reconsidered macro- and trade policies, will stop the current downward spiral of the 
Russian economy ending increased inequality on all dimensions. The basics of the core 
activities and responsibilities of the state need urgently to be rebuilt. Industrial policies will 
have to be implemented that will help to close the large productivity gap with the west and 
will exploit the innovativeness of Russian human capital. Concentration on resource 
extraction industries, which in addition are driven by the dynamics of scale economies in 
exploitation leading to further concentration of wealth and power, will enhance the 
disintegration processes within the Russian Federation and lead to a further escalation of 
social, political and ethnic tensions. Policy measures that support manufacturing and 
services — sectors that benefit from openness, knowledge spillovers and cooperation — will 
help to avoid a situation where Russia, which is after all still the first or second nuclear 
super-power in the world, continues to be an unpredictable player in geopolitical disputes, 
but will make Russia an equal trading partner for mutual benefit.  
Western policy makers should understand that, in the long run, the west would receive more 
profit from economic integration with Russia than from trade with cheap oil and gas and 
other raw materials. Finally, the broader goal of sustainable, egalitarian and democratic 
development is unlikely to happen in a natural resource dependent economy. 
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